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Crawford and Sobel (1982) developed a model of strategic information transmission in
which a better-informed sender sends a possibly informative signal to a decision-making
receiver and studied how strategically transmitted information is related to the analogy
between the two playersinterests. They adopted the Bayesian Nash equilibrium as their
equilibrium concept and showed that the signal by the sender, the transmitted information,
is more informative in pareto-superior equilibrium when the playersinterests are more anal-
ogous. Their analyses, however, are not complete in that they analyzed the model based
on partial consideration of the playersbehavior, mixed behavior of the sender and pure
behavior of the receiver. In the present study, we attempt to complete their analyses by
1 Department of Economics, Lahore University of Management Sciences, DHA, Lahore, Pakistan
Email address: hanjoon@lums.edu.pk
1
analyzing the model based on full consideration of the players behavior, both pure and
mixed behavior. We adopt the Nash equilibrium as our equilibrium concept and conclude
that results in our complete analyses are similar to the results in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
We rst review the model introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982), hereinafter referred
to as CS. There are two players, a sender and a receiver, and they play a signaling game. So,
only the sender observes its typem 2 [0; 1] and makes a signal n 2 N to the receiver where N
is an uncountable borel set of feasible signals. Then, after observing the signal n, the receiver
chooses its action y 2 R. Here, the senders typem is a random variable from a di¤erentiable
probability distribution function F (m) with a probability density function f(m). In addition,
the sender has a twice continuously di¤erentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
US(y;m; b) where b is a scalar parameter. The receiver has another twice continuously
di¤erentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function UR(y;m).
Under this setting of the model, CS dened strategies as follows. The senders strategy
was dened as a function q : N  [0; 1]  ! R+ such that for each m 2 [0; 1],
R
N
q(njm)dn
= 1. In the equation
R
N
q(njm)dn = 1, the left-hand side is an integral of q with respect
to the Lebesgue measure. Hence, this denition requires q to be integrable with respect to
the Lebesgue measure and its integral over N to be one for each xed m, which in turn
implies that q(njm) is a conditional probability density function in n given m. That is, the
senders strategy was dened as a conditional probability density function in signals given
its types. Next, the receivers strategy was dened as a function y : [0; 1]  ! R. Thus, it
was dened as an action plan y() such that given a signal n, y(n) species a single action
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for the receiver.
These denitions of the strategies, however, limit the playersbehavior, and consequently
they leave the analyses in CS incomplete. In the senders case, a conditional probability
density function q can represent only mixed behavior that assigns zero probability to every
signal n 2 N . Accordingly, it cannot express any behavior that assigns positive probability
to a single signal n. So, this denition excludes all pure behavior under which each type m
of the sender would send only one signal n(m) 2 N . For example, q cannot describe the
senders behavior of truthful signaling which reveals its type truthfully; that is, n(m) = m.
In the receivers case, on the other hand, an action plan y() can represent pure behavior, but
not mixed behavior. This is because y() species only one action for each signal2 n. Since
the analyses in CS base on these denitions, they consider only part of the playersbehavior,
the mixed behavior by the sender and the pure behavior by the receiver. Therefore, those
analyses are not complete.
To complete the analyses in CS, we propose new denitions for the playersstrategies.
First, the senders strategy is dened as a function  : [0; 1]ß(N)  ! [0; 1] whereß(N) is
2 CS claimed that the receiver would never choose mixed behavior in equilibrium, which might justify
their limited consideration on the receivers behavior. Their claim, however, is only partially true because
the receiver would choose pure behavior only with probability one in equilibrium. Thus, it is possible
that the receiver chooses mixed behavior in equilibrium, but all such equilibrium outcomes would happen
with probability zero. This is because given the senders signals n, the receiver might not be able to gure
out conditional probability density functions in the senders types m according to Bayesrule. Then, the
receivers expected utility function would not be well-dened, and thus every action y 2 R could be the
best response to those signals n. Consequently, if the receiver would choose mixed actions y0 such that
those signals n are the senders best responses to y0, then the receivers mixed actions y0 could be induced
in equilibrium. However, a set of the senders signals from which the receiver cannot gure out conditional
probability density functions has probability zero to happen, and as a result the receivers mixed behavior
can happen at most with probability zero.
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the class of the Borel subsets3 of N such that i) for each m 2 [0; 1], (m; ) is a probability
measure on ß(N) and ii) for each A 2 ß(N), (;A) is ß[0; 1] measurable. Here, (m;A)
denotes probability assigned to a set of signals A given a state m. Next, the receivers
strategy is dened as another function  : N ß(R)  ! [0; 1] where ß(R) is the class of
the Borel subsets of R such that i) for each n 2 N , (n; ) is a probability measure onß(R)
and ii) for each Y 2ß(R), (;Y ) isß(N) measurable4 . Again, (n;Y ) denotes probability
assigned to a set of actions Y given a signal n.
In these denitions, the conditions i) require (m; ) and (n; ) to specify what to play
at every information set m in [0; 1] and n in N , respectively. The conditions ii) require
the strategies  and  to well-dene expected utilities. Then, it is easy to see that these
denitions of the players strategies can properly describe both the pure and the mixed
behavior, and as a result the analyses in CS can be completed through them. Let S be the
set of the strategies for the sender and let R be the set of the strategies for the receiver.
Note that these denitions originated from Balder (1988) and Jung (2009) and are adapted
for the model by CS.
The solution concept in CS also needs to be changed for the complete analyses because
it is not compatible with our new denitions of the strategies. CS adopted the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium under which the players formed conditional probabilistic beliefs about
each others actions and types and maximized their expected utilities with respect to their
3 Given a Borel set X, the class of the Borel subsets ß(X) is the smallest class of subsets of X such that
i)ß(X) contains all open subsets of X and ii)ß(X) is closed under countable unions and complements.
4 These strategies  and  are also known as transition probabilities. For information on the transition
probability, please refer to Neveu (1965, III) and Ash (1972, 2.6).
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beliefs. Here, the receiver was assumed to use Bayesrule to update its belief. Bayesrule,
however, would not properly condition the receivers belief with respect to our strategies.
This is because Bayesrule denes a belief as proportion and our strategies do not always
allow such proportion. Consequently, we adopt the Nash equilibrium concept, which is not
related to Bayesrule.
The Nash equilibrium concept is known to be weak in that it does not properly condition
actions o¤ the equilibrium path, and the equilibrium concept used by CS also has this
weakness in common. A Nash equilibrium is a prole of strategies that consist of rational
actions on the equilibrium path. Thus, it might contain irrational actions o¤ the equilibrium
path. The problem with these irrational actions is that they could newly rationalize actions
on the equilibrium path, which cannot be rationalized by only rational actions. In this
case, since we cannot actually rationalize these irrational actions o¤ the equilibrium path,
we cannot properly rationalize those actions on the equilibrium path. Accordingly, some of
the Nash equilibrium outcomes could not be rationalized properly. The equilibrium in CS
shows the same weakness as the Nash equilibrium does. In their equilibrium, the receivers
conditional expected utility functions are not well-dened o¤ the equilibrium path5 . Since
the receivers rational actions base on its conditional expected utility functions, they are not
well-dened o¤ the equilibrium path either. As a result, the equilibrium concept in CS does
not properly condition actions o¤ the equilibrium path.
5 The receivers conditional expected utility functions are dened based on its conditional probability
density functions. The conditional probability density functions base on Bayes rule. However, o¤ the
equilibrium path, Bayesrule cannot be applied. Thus, the receivers conditional probability density functions
are not well-dened o¤ the equilibrium path. Therefore, the receivers conditional expected utility functions
are not well-dened o¤ the equilibrium path.
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This weakness of the Nash equilibrium, however, is innocuous in the current model be-
cause it does not a¤ect outcomes in equilibrium. In this model, the senders signals are
irrelevant to the playersutilities. They just function as a means of information transmis-
sion. Thus, each individual signal can be rationalized by the receivers rational actions in
equilibrium, either o¤ the equilibrium path or on the equilibrium path. That is, no signal
is newly rationalized by the receivers irrational actions o¤ the equilibrium path, which ac-
cordingly means that these irrational actions do not a¤ect equilibrium outcomes. Therefore,
the weakness of the Nash equilibrium, inability to condition actions o¤ the equilibrium path,
has no e¤ect on equilibrium outcomes6 .
A formal denition of the Nash equilibrium is as follows. For simplicity, we dene a
probability measure P : ß[0; 1]  ! [0; 1] as P (M) = R
M
f(m)dm for M 2 ß[0; 1]. In the
denition, the integrals are well-dened for each strategy prole (; ) 2 S R according
to Ash (1972, 2.6) because the utility functions US and UR are assumed to be continuous
and bounded above7 .
Denition 1 (Nash equilibrium) A strategy prole (; ) is a Nash equilibrium if they
solve
max
 2S
R
[0;1]
R
N
R
R
US(y;m; b)(n; dy)(m; dn)P (dm)
and
max
 2R
R
[0;1]
R
N
R
R
UR(y;m)(n; dy)(m; dn)P (dm).
6 Likewise, we can see that the weakness of the Nash equilibrium is innocuous in cheap talk games in
which i) there are two players, a sender and a receiver, and ii) the senders actions are irrelevant to the
playersutilities.
7 CS assumed that for each m 2 [0; 1], there are a and a0 in R such that @US(a;m;b)@a = 0 and @U
R(a0;m)
@a0 = 0.
Also, they assumed that US and UR are strictly concave in a. These two assumptions imply that US and
UR are bounded above.
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Finally, our complete analyses lead to results similar to the results in CS. Concretely, if
the playersinterests di¤er, then Nash equilibria derived under the complete denitions of
the strategies are all partition equilibria8 that Crawford and Sobel (1982) derived under the
partial denitions of the strategies, which can represent only the senders mixed behavior and
the receivers pure behavior, with an exception of an action set that happens with probability
zero. Consequently, every theorem in Crawford and Sobel (1982) stays true almost surely
under the complete denitions of the playersstrategies, and therefore the senders signals
are more informative in pareto-superior equilibrium when the players interests are more
analogous. Here, the exception in equilibrium happens because the Nash equilibrium concept
cannot condition actions that do not a¤ect expected utilities. In a Nash equilibrium (; )
2 S  R, a set of actions Y  R happens with probability zero if and only if we haveR
[0;1]
R
N
R
Y
(n; dy)(m; dn)P (dm) = 0. Hence, those actions in the set Y do not a¤ect
expected utilities, and so they could be part of a Nash equilibrium.
This similarity between the results in CS and the results in our complete analyses is
due to a hypothesis on the players interests and an assumption on the receivers utility
function. In this model, the senders signaling is an informational activity. So, the receiver
could infer the senders types from its signals. Thus, if the senders interests di¤er from the
receivers interests, then the sender would not make perfectly informative signals from which
the receiver can completely gure out the senders types because the perfectly informative
8 A partition equilibrium in CS is an equilibrium in which i) signals sent by the sender partition its
type space [0; 1] into a nite number of intervals and ii) actions chosen by the receiver in equilibrium are
monotonically associated with the intervals. In this denition, monotonicity implies that higher actions are
associated with higher intervals in the partition.
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signals would lead to the receivers favorite outcomes that contradict to the senders interests.
Accordingly, the sender would make only imperfectly informative signals in equilibrium.
Here, these imperfectly informative signals can be represented both by the pure behavior
and by the mixed behavior while the perfectly informative signals can be represented only
by the pure behavior. Note that the denition of the senders strategies in CS admits
the mixed behavior. Therefore, under the hypothesis that the senders interests di¤er from
the receivers interests, the senders signals in equilibrium can be described according to
the partial denition of the senders strategies in CS as well as according to the complete
denition in the current study9 .
In addition, CS assumed that the second-order partial derivative of the receivers utility
function, UR11, satises U
R
11(y;m) < 0 for every y and m. Then, U
R has a unique maximum
in actions y for each state m, and thus this assumption induces the pure behavior by the
receiver almost surely in equilibrium. Note that the denition of the receivers strategies
in CS allows the pure behavior. Therefore, under the assumption of UR11 < 0, the receivers
actions in equilibrium can be expressed almost surely according to the partial denition of
the receivers strategies in CS as well as according to the complete denition in the current
study. Consequently, our complete analyses end up with the same results as the results in
CS almost surely.
9 If the playersinterests coincide, then one of Nash equilibria contains perfectly informative signals by
the sender. However, this Nash equilibrium is not an equilibrium in CS because the perfectly informative
signals cannot be represented according to the partial denition of the senders strategies in CS. Therefore,
if the playersinterests coincide, then the results in CS di¤er from the results in the current study.
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